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I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who dares to explore the field of informed consent in alternative
dispute resolution quickly comes to appreciate the quagmire of differing
expert viewpoints, of conflicting (or silent) codes of conduct, statutes and
rules, of divergent definitions of processes, and of the complexity of the topic
generally. 1 For example, there are vigorous inquiries and debates about
whether pro se parties, in the context of court-annexed mediation, should be
informed about their legal rights before being encouraged to settle their case
in mediation,2 about what amount of information parties in mediation should
receive concerning confidentiality and its exceptions, 3 and about the process
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I See generally Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A
Guiding Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775
(1999); Samuel J. Imperati, Alternative Dispute Resolution Symposium Issue: Mediator
Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic Practices in Mediation, 33
WILLAMElTE L. REv. 703 (1997).
2 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 834-38.
3 The Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA") and a variety of other laws create a
privilege for mediation communications and then carve out exceptions to confidentiality
protections. Professor James Coben created a videotape for a CLE program offered on
October 22, 2001 at the 4th Annual ADR Institute, sponsored by the Minnesota Bar
Association in Minneapolis, which illustrated the futility and destructiveness of trying to
explain confidentiality and catalogue its numerous exceptions in the context of a
mediator's opening statement. (videotape on file with the authors). Nonetheless,
mediators must find meaningful ways to present confidentiality, including indicating that
exceptions to coverage exist.
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of mediation and the credentials of the mediator. 4
This essay explores only one facet of the question of informed consent:
what mediators should tell parties before providing an evaluation or opinion
on the merits of a legal question (or some other aspect of a situation where
parties request an opinion and the mediator is credentialed in the relevant
area). What might comprehensive ethics codes provide? What does good
practice dictate? What warnings for the unwary must be given?
Our purpose is not to extend the debate on whether evaluative mediator
behaviors can be incorporated within the meaning of mediation, 5 or on
whether evaluative mediation is an oxymoron 6 that should be replaced by
4 In Minnesota, for (an unusual) example, compensated mediators must provide
parties with a written summary of their qualifications prior to the mediation. MINN. STAT.
§ 572.37 (2004) ("No individual may act as a mediator pursuant to the Minnesota Civil
Mediation Act for compensation without providing the individuals to the conflict with a
written statement of qualifications prior to beginning mediation. The statement shall
describe educational background and relevant training and experience in the field."). A
violator risks criminal sanctions. Id. ("A person who violates this section is guilty of a
petty misdemeanor."). For a thoughtful critique of this law, see James R. Coben & Peter
N. Thompson, The Haghighi Trilogy and the Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a
Phantom Menace Casting a Pall Over the Development of ADR in Minnesota, 20
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 299 (1999) (arguing that criminal sanctions are absurd in
this context and a waste of criminal justice resources).
5 A partial list of articles focusing on the question of mediator evaluation includes:
Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996) (including mediators who
have an evaluative orientation on a grid describing the mediation universe); Kimberlee K.
Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 71 (1998) (arguing that a mediator should maintain a facilitative
orientation); Marjorie Corman Aaron, ADR Toolbox: The Highwire Art of Evaluation, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 62 (1996) (describing appropriate uses for
mediator evaluation and recommending specific mediator strategies); James J. Alfini,
Evaluative versus Facilitative Mediation: A Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919
(1997); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to Evaluate
or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669 (1997) (arguing against ethical rules that prohibit
mediator evaluation); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies:
The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 949 (1997) (endorsing flexible mediation that permits judicious use of evaluative
techniques); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997) (arguing that the central
values of the mediation process appear least congruent with the notion of the evaluative
mediator); Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes,
Rather than One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 295 (arguing that when mediators
provide evaluations the process should be labeled mediation and neutral evaluation).
6 Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, "Evaluative" Mediation Is An Oxymoron,
14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST OF LITIG. 31 (1996).
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different descriptors, or on whether certain types of evaluation constitute the
practice of law. 7 In fact, a significant portion of the marketplace, particularly
in the court-annexed and lawyered arenas, seems drawn to mediators who
provide evaluations as part of their repertoires. 8 In addition, many scholars
and practitioners argue that requested mediator evaluations can advance
meaningful self-determination and informed consent. 9 In a recent study of
participants' experience in special education mediation, scholar Nancy Welsh
found that parents valued evaluative mediator behaviors that helped move
toward resolution so long as parents felt the mediator understood their
concerns. 10 Since it is being done in the field, with reported success, it
becomes important that it be done in a manner most constructive to party
self-determination, which is the first principle of mediation." I
7 Carrie Menkel-Meakow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No
Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers'Responsibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REv.
407, 424 (1997) (arguing that when mediators evaluate cases by applying legal principles
to specific facts, they are engaging in the practice of law); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving
the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators,
14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 479, 505 (2000).
8 Laflin, supra note 7, at 486 (noting that studies show a preference among lawyers
for evaluative mediators); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Substituting Mediation for
Arbitration: The Growing Market for Evaluative Mediation, and What it Means for the
ADR Field, 3 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 111, 122 (2002) (explaining the growth of
evaluative mediation as an arbitration substitute which filled a vacuum created by
arbitration becoming more formal, expensive, and "judicialized").
9 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 797; James H. Stark, The Ethics of Mediation
Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions And Tentative Proposals, from an Evaluative
Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 795 (1997); James H. Stark, Preliminary
Reflections on the Establishment of a Mediation Clinic, 2 CLINICAL L. REv. 457, 487
(1996); Donald Weckstein, In Praise of Party Empowerment-And of Mediator Activism,
33 WILLAMETrE L. REv. 501, 526 (1997) (noting that party and lawyer preference for
evaluative mediation is "consistent with disputant empowerment"); Leonard Riskin,
Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DISP.
RESOL. 95, 101-02 (commenting that "evaluation can enhance self-determination");
Robert B. Moberly, supra note 5, at 772 (1997) (arguing that self-determination calls for
evaluation if parties express that as their preference).
10 Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. REsOL. 573, 644 (2004).
11 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard 1 (2005) ("A
mediator shall conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination.").
See also FLA. R. CERTIFIED & CT. APP'TED MED. 10.230 (2005) ("Mediation is based on
concepts of communication, negotiation, facilitation, and problem-solving that
emphasize: (a) self determination .... ); VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT
2.11 (d) (2005) ("A lawyer-mediator may offer evaluation of, for example, strengths and
weaknesses of positions, assess the value and cost of alternatives to settlement, or assess
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This article will explore principles to guide mediators in responsibly
performing their duty of ensuring that parties give their informed consent
prior to a mediator jumping into a requested evaluative or decisional role. In
articulating principles and guidelines, we will have to answer: What should
be said to parties? When should it be said? How can consent be given?
Additionally, once consent is given, the evaluation must comport with an
appropriate standard of care. How careful must a mediator be in providing an
opinion or professional advice? Should a mediator providing legal analysis,
for example, be held to the same standard of care as a lawyer providing legal
advice to a client? Of course, any mediator must comply with rules and
regulations that may limit evaluative conduct in particular jurisdictions and
on particular panels. We begin by discussing informed consent.
II. INFORMED CONSENT
A. Background
In many contexts, our legal system measures "consent" to a process, an
agreement, the assumption of a risk, or a waiver of rights against a standard
of disclosure and adequate understanding. 12 Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 1.0(e) for lawyers, for example, defines informed consent with
respect to attorneys and clients as follows: "[T]he agreement by a person to a
proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate
information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. ' 13 The quality of the
necessary information-or disclosure-as well as the consent itself, may
depend upon the sophistication and representation of a client. In some cases,
"consent" must be evidenced in writing. 14
In considering the necessary party consent to an arbitrator serving as a
settlement facilitator (the opposite situation of a mediator serving as an
the barriers to settlement (collectively referred to as evaluation) only if such evaluation is
incidental to the facilitative role and does not interfere with the lawyer-mediator's
impartiality or the self-determination of the parties.").
12 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 778.
13 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2004).
14 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2004) ("Notwithstanding
the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest..., a lawyer may represent a client
if... (4) each client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing."); id. R. 1.9(a) ("A
lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent
another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's
interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former
client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.").
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evaluator), the International Bar Association's ("IBA") Working Group,
which formulated the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International
Arbitration,15 concluded:
Considering the sensitive position of the arbitrator as potential settlement
facilitator.., the taskforce and the Working Group determined that the
parties must give their express agreement prior to the commencement of
such a process. This express agreement will be considered an effective
waiver of any potential conflict of interest that might arise from the
arbitrator's participation in settlement or from any information that the
arbitrator may learn in the process. After some debate and consideration of
the issue, the Working Group agreed that the express agreement need not be
in writing, but could be, for instance, an oral agreement reflected in the
minutes of a hearing. 16
In other words, med-arb (which is similar to a mediator taking on a
decisional role) requires a high level of informed consent.
The standard of care with respect to informed consent as it applies to
lawyers and arbitrators is relatively well defined, as contrasted with that
applying to mediators. A review of the literature on informed consent in
mediation reveals disagreement and confusion regarding what, precisely,
parties should be informed of prior to consenting to participate in mediation.
Despite the widespread use of the term "informed consent" in the literature
and the disparities in its definition, the Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators, adopted by a joint committee of the American Bar Association,
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution and the American
Arbitration Association in 1994, and its 2005 revisions, 17 do not refer to the
term "informed consent," perhaps because no one fully understands or agrees
to what it means in the mediation context. 18 The silence is surprising because
"informed consent" provides the foundation for self-determination and
15 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in Int'l Arbitration (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf.
16 For the Working Group, Otto L 0 de Witt Wijnen et al., Background Information
on the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, 5 Bus. L.
INT'L 433, 452 (2004).
17 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.mediate.com/pdf/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf; MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (1994), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/dr/msoc/pdf/original-standards.pdf.
18 The Model Standards do refer to parties making "informed choices as to process."
MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard I.A. (2005). We feel that this
general prescription does not have the force or clarity of a more explicit duty to obtain
informed consent as urged in this article.
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voluntariness in the selection of, and party participation in, a particular ADR
process. 19 According to Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, in her classic
article on informed consent,
A robust theory of informed consent requires that parties be educated about
mediation before they consent to participate in it .... Informed consent
serves the values of autonomy, human dignity, and efficiency. It guards
against coercion, ignorance, and incapacity that can impede the consensual
underpinnings of the mediation process. 2 0
Deconstructing these lofty aspirations into concrete mediator practices
becomes the challenge.
B. Informed Consent in Mediation
While the term "informed consent" is not always used, many existing
regulations of and policy statements about mediation require disclosure and
(sometimes) party consent. These have the impact of mandating informed
consent even where that term is not used. Examples of various components
of "informed consent" relevant to adequate party education about the
mediator providing legal or other professional evaluations are covered by
existing guidelines that address the following: parties' understanding and
choice of different mediation models (e.g., facilitative, evaluative,
transformative, or some combination of these);21 consequences of revealing
19 See generally Nolan-Haley, supra note 1.
20 Id. at 812.
21 See Imperati, supra note 1, at 744; VA. SuP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT
2.11(d) and (e)(l)(i) (2005) (providing "(d) A lawyer-mediator may offer evaluation
of... strengths and weaknesses of positions, assess the value and cost of alternatives to
settlement or assess the barriers to settlement.. .only if such evaluation is incidental to
the facilitative role and does not interfere with the lawyer-mediator's impartiality or the
self-determination of the parties," and "(e) Prior to the mediation session a lawyer-
mediator shall: (1) consult with prospective parties about (i) the nature of the mediation
process...."); Or. Jud. Court-Connected Mediator Qualifications § 1.4(3) (2005)
(providing that a mediator must "[i]nform the participants prior to or at the
commencement of the mediation of... (a) The nature of mediation, the role and style of
the mediator, and the process that will be used..."). See also OR. UNIF. TRIAL CT. R.
12.530(2)(b) (2003); CAL. CT. R. 1620.7(c)(1) and (g) (2005) (providing "(c)... at or
before the outset of the mediation the mediator must provide all participants with a
general explanation of: (1) The nature of the mediation process," and "(g) The mediator
must inform the parties of the general natures of the different [dispute resolution
processes]."); GA. ALTERNATIVE DisP. RESOL. RULES, App. C, ch. I(A)(I)(A) (2005) ("A
principal duty of the mediator is to fully explain the mediation process. This explanation
[Vol. 21:1 2005]
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information during any one process that might be used for decision making
in another process;22 parties' right to know when the transition from one
process to another is occurring;23 parties' opportunity to select another
neutral for the subsequent process; 24 the mediator's subject matter
expertise; 25 the mediator offering legal information;26 restrictions on the
neutral's performance of professional services in any capacity (other than the
neutral capacity);27 and limitations on the use of mediator evaluation.28
should include ... the role of the mediator as a neutral person who will facilitate the
discussion between the parties but who will not coerce or control the outcome ... [and]
the procedure which will be followed during the mediation session."); ALM SUP. JUD.
CT. R. 1:18, § 9(c) (2004) ("The neutral shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that
each party to the dispute resolution process ... understands the nature and character of
the process."); Ass'N FOR CONFLICT RESOL., THE AUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF MEDIATION
6 (Proposed Draft 2004) [hereinafter APM Report], available at
http://www.acmet.org/pdfs/upl-draftrpt-aug04.pdf.
22 CAL. CT. R. 1620.7(g) (2005) ("A mediator must exercise caution in combining
mediation with other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes and may do so only
with the informed consent of the parties .... The mediator must inform the parties of the
general natures of the different processes and the consequences of revealing information
during any one process that might be used for decision making in another process .... ).
23 CAL. CT. R. 1620.7(g) (2005) ("If the parties consent to a combination of
processes, the mediator must clearly inform the participants when the transition from one
process to another is occurring."); ALM Sup. JuD. CT. R. 1:18, § 9(c)(i) ("A neutral shall
make every reasonable effort to ensure at every stage of the proceedings that each party
understands the dispute resolution process in which he or she is participating.").
24 CAL. CT. R. 1620.7(g) (2005) ("The mediator must inform the parties
of... different processes... and must give the parties the opportunity to select another
neutral for the subsequent process.").
25 VA. SuP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.1 l(e)(1)(iii) (2005) (providing
"(e) Prior to the mediation session a lawyer-mediator shall: (1) consult with prospective
parties about... (iii) the lawyer-mediator's approach, style and subject matter
expertise .. ").
26 VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.11 (c) (2005) ("A lawyer-mediator
may offer legal information if all parties are present or separately to the parties if they
consent. The lawyer-mediator shall inform unrepresented parties or those parties who are
not accompanied by legal counsel about the importance of reviewing the lawyer-
mediator's legal information with legal counsel."); GA. ALTERNATIVE Disp. RES. R. APP.
C, ch. I(A)(1)(A)(4) (2005) (requiring that a mediator provide "[a]n explanation of the
fact that the mediator will not give legal or financial advice and that if expert advice is
needed, parties will be expected to refer to outside experts").
27 CAL. CT. R. 1620.7(d) (2005) ("A mediator must inform all participants, at or
before the outset of the first mediation session, that during the mediation he or she will
not represent any participant as a lawyer or perform professional services in any capacity
other than as an impartial mediator."); FLA. R. CERTIFIED & CT. APP'TED MED. 10.340(d)
(2005) ("During a mediation, a mediator shall not provide any services that are not
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In reviewing literature on informed consent in mediation, several
perspectives are helpful in framing a theory of obtaining informed consent
for evaluative mediator conduct: institutional definitions, the distinction
between participation and outcome consent, the aspiration of "high quality
consent," and the notion of critical (or decision) points. We review each
below.
1. Institutional Definitions of Informed Consent in Mediation
Three examples of policy statements and rules on informed consent
display a range of concerns and approaches.
The August 28, 2004 Draft of the Association for Conflict Resolution's
("ACR") Proposed Policy Statement on "The Authorized Practice of
Mediation," issued for comment by the Board of Directors of ACR, defines
informed consent as follows:
Informed Consent. Respect for the nature of the parties' voluntary
participation in a mediation calls for that participation to be grounded in
informed consent. In other words, parties have the right to "understand the
nature of the process, the procedures, the particular role of the neutral, and
the parties' relationship to the neutral." This is a continuing right.29
The Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts provide an even more basic approach:
Informed Consent. The neutral shall make every reasonable effort to
ensure that each party to the dispute resolution process (a) understands the
nature and character of the process, and (b) in consensual processes,
understands and voluntarily consents to any agreement reached in the
process.30
The Virginia Supreme Court Rules add considerable meat to the bones of
directly related to the mediation process.").
28 VA. SuP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.11 (e)(1)(ii) (2005) (providing
"(e) Prior to the mediation session a lawyer-mediator shall: (1) consult with prospective
parties about... (ii) the limitations on the use of evaluation, as set forth in subparagraph
(d) ...."). See VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2, R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.1 1(d) (2005), supra note
11, subpara. (d).
2 9 APM Report, supra note 21, at 6. A final version of the Proposed Policy
Statement has not yet been approved, according to an email from David Hart, CEO of
ACR on October 7, 2005, to Jack Cooley (footnotes and citations omitted) (on file with
authors).
30 ALM Sup. JuD. CT. R. 1:18, § 9(c) (2003).
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the ACR draft Policy Statement and the Massachusetts Rule:
Informed Consent to Mediator's Approach. The rule focuses on the
informed consent of the prospective mediation clients to the particular
approach, style and subject matter expertise of the lawyer-mediator. This
begins with consultation about the nature of the mediation process, the
limitations on evaluation, the lawyer-mediator's approach, style, and
subject-matter expertise and the parties' expectations regarding the
mediation process. If the parties request an evaluative approach, the lawyer-
mediator shall explain the risk that evaluation might interfere with mediator
impartiality and self-determination. 31
At the simplest level, each of these prescriptive definitions of informed
consent obligate the mediator to ensure that parties understand the nature of
the process. ACR's Proposed Policy Statement adds that parties must
understand the procedures to be utilized and the role of the mediator as
critical elements of informed consent, emphasizing the ongoing character of
the neutral's duty to keep the parties informed about the process. The
Virginia rule spells out in far more detail the meaning of informed consent.
In each case, however, the requirement that the mediator obtain the parties'
informed consent supports a notion of mediation as a voluntary process,
where informed consent makes participation and self-determination
meaningful.
2. Participant and Outcome Consent in Mediation
Professor Jacquelyn Nolan-Haley identifies two types of consent that
operate during a mediation-"participation consent" and "outcome consent":
Meaningful consent must be voluntary and should be given with an
understanding of its attendant consequences. Consent to participate in the
mediation process, what I will call "participation consent," has several
dimensions. It involves a conscious, knowledgeable decision to enter into
the mediation process and to continue participating in mediation through
good faith negotiations. This is more than a matter of signing a form
agreement to mediate. It involves an ongoing commitment to honor the
integrity of the mediation process ....
Consent to the outcome reached in mediation, what I will call "outcome
consent," involves a separate decision to accept the agreement that is
reached with an understanding of its content, its consequences, and what
options are being waived by such consent. This requires sufficient factual
31 VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6 § 2; R. PROF'L CONDUCT 2.11 n.3 (2005).
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and substantive information. In this sense then, disclosure and consent are
linked concepts and, without sufficient disclosures, "outcome consent" is
suspect.32
In important ways participation consent is not meaningful without full
understanding about the process. Such understanding includes whether or not
the mediator will be facilitating party evaluation or supplying neutral
evaluation (or both). To the extent that "outcome consent" rests on a
mediator evaluation, the basis for the evaluation should be known. If, for
example, the mediator misrepresents her expertise or fails to highlight ways
in which her evaluation is based on different information than what a judge
would have, the "outcome consent" might be flawed.
3. "High-quality" Consent in Mediation
Professor John Lande has argued in favor of achieving what he calls
"high-quality consent" in mediation.3 3 Lande urges that parties should
exercise responsibility for making decisions in a dispute by considering the
situation sufficiently and without excessive pressure. He offers seven factors
intended to provide principals, their attorneys, mediators, or other observers
with practical criteria for determining the quality level of consent of a
principal in mediation. Those factors are as follows:
(1) explicit identification of the principals' goals and interests, (2) explicit
identification of plausible options for satisfying these interests, (3) the
principals' explicit selection of options for evaluation, (4) careful
consideration of these options, (5) the mediators' restraint in pressuring
principals to accept particular substantive options, (6) limitation on use of
time pressure, and (7) confirmation of principals' consent to selected
options. 34
Professor Lande suggests that the development of a fairly clear and
generally accepted conception of "high-quality consent," as represented by
these seven factors, may be an important factor in the improvement of both
lawyering practices and mediation practices in future years. The notion of
"high-quality consent" supports a conception of mediation premised on party
control of process and outcomes. Such control without meaningful
understanding is illusory.
32 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 819-20 (footnotes and citations omitted).
33 John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839 (1997).
34 Id. at 869.
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4. "Decision Points " Relating to Consent in Mediation
Finally, Samuel Imperati highlights "decision points" where a mediator
might usefully direct parties to consider important elements of the process.
Below are several such "decision points" relating to evaluative mediator
conduct:
* How much subject matter expertise should the mediator have, and
when and how should such expertise be used?
* Should the mediator offer options or propose settlement terms? If
yes, under what circumstances?
" Should the mediator offer opinions? If yes, under what
circumstances?
* Should the mediator raise issues, claims or defenses? If yes, under
what circumstances?
* Should the mediator offer "legal information" as contrasted with
"legal advice?" 35
Imperati's "decision points" or questions provide a useful checklist for
evaluative mediators to ensure party consent and agreement prior to using
evaluative tools. This, in turn, serves party control and self-determination.
C. Informed Consent for Mediator Evaluation
With respect to understanding and agreeing to a classic evaluation on the
part of a mediator, 36 informed consent is a relatively straightforward concept.
Simply put, parties are entitled to understand what they are requesting (or
what is being proposed by the mediator) and to be forewarned of dangers
they might face prior to their consenting to the mediator's provision of an
35 Imperati, supra note 1, at 743.
36 By "classic evaluation" we want to posit a bright line situation. For example, a
classic evaluation would be where a mediator agrees to provide an opinion on the likely
court outcome (a dollar amount or a monetary range) in a personal injury action. At the
same time, we acknowledge that there is a large grey area between facilitative mediator
reality testing and the provision of an evaluation. Margaret Shaw, a well known and
highly respected mediator, trainer, and scholar, has advocated that evaluation should be
viewed on a continuum of behaviors rather than posited as an "either/or." See Margaret L.
Shaw, Style Schmyle! What's Evaluation Got To Do With It?, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Spring
2005, at 19. Certainly a continuum exists, but so does a bright line. While it is hard to
find the line, there is one between reality-testing and opinion-giving, between mediation
and arbitration-or, to extend the point, between pornography and art, and illusion and
reality. This is circular in that while arguing that a line exists, one must also acknowledge
lack of unanimity on where the line is!
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evaluation. Once adequately warned, parties are deemed to have assumed the
risk voluntarily if they consent and hence be responsible for the
consequences of their choice.
What then constitutes consent to engage in an evaluative process? Any
definition of informed consent should be carefully crafted to describe the
precise scope of the consent to an evaluative process. At a minimum, a
party's consent should cover elements that current mediation court rules
generally require when an evaluation is contemplated, requested, or
proffered. The scope of a party's consent should encompass a freely-made,
voluntary decision: (1) to participate in a specific type of evaluative process
based on a clear understanding of the benefits, limitations, and risks
associated with the process; (2) to be satisfied with the specifically described
role of the neutral and the neutral's related ethical responsibilities in the
evaluative process; and (3) to be satisfied with the nature and amount of any
additional fees and costs charged by the neutral in conducting the evaluative
process.
III. DECISIONAL MEDIATOR CONDUCT TRIGGERING THE NEED FOR
INFORMED CONSENT
A. Evaluative or Decisional Mediator Behaviors
As noted above, in September 2004 the Board of Directors of the
Association for Conflict Resolution issued for comment a Proposed Policy
Statement entitled "The Authorized Practice of Mediation." 37 The purpose of
the policy statement was "to delineate proper and improper mediation
practices." 38 In considering what conduct constituted the authorized practice
of mediation, the Task Force that studied the topic examined the following
evaluative mediator moves39 (with examples provided by the authors of this
article in parentheses):
" Advise parties about their legal rights or responsibilities. (e.g., "You
do not have standing to bring this claim. ")
* Apply legal precedent to the specific facts of the dispute. (e.g., "Your
supervisor may be a poor manager, but the situation you describe is
not race discrimination. ")
37 See APM Report, supra note 21.
3 8 1d. at2.
39 The Task Force found that the first three moves listed are "improper mediation
practice" and the final two moves listed are "mediation practice warranting increased
scrutiny depending on context." Id. at 10-11.
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* Offer any personal or professional opinion as to how the court (judge
or jury) in which a case has been filed will resolve the dispute. (e.g.,
"You are not likely to win on appeal. ")
" Provide any personal or professional evaluation of the strengths and
weaknesses of the case, either directly or implicitly. (e.g., "Your
claim for punitive damages is problematic. ")
" Recommend a specific course of action. (e.g., "Take this offer. You
will not get a better one. ")
A mediator's intention to engage in one or more of these behaviors in a
mediation session may trigger a duty of the mediator to inform parties that an
evaluation is being offered and parties' consent is needed prior to going
forward.40
The line between evaluative or decisional conduct that we describe here,
and the "reality testing" of a facilitative mediator is difficult to discern. For
example, a mediator facilitating party evaluation may properly facilitate the
parties' conversation about applicable law, their discussion about the
strengths and weaknesses of their respective cases, and their discussion of
alternatives and options.41 In pursuit of those goals, the mediator may ask:
* "Have you considered the point Lawyer A made concerning his
belief that you do not have standing to bring this claim?"
* "Could you explain to me why you think this is discrimination as
opposed to just poor management?"
* "Imagine that you lost your appeal, can you explain why that might
have happened? "
* "Have you considered getting legal advice about the claim for
punitive damages ?"
* "Have you considered the signal you will send by rejecting this
offer? If these negotiations break down, tell me again about your
litigation option. "
Such questions have an evaluative component but-most importantly-are
calling on the party to make evaluations. It is the mediator providing her
opinion that raises the duty to warn we describe here.42
40 Id. at 12 (stating that a "mediator must review with the parties the
implications of... a process change").
41 The Task Force found this conduct to be the authorized practice of mediation.
Id. at 9.
42 Tone, body-language, and gestures can turn an otherwise reality-testing question
into an evaluation or opinion. The point is to stay within the advertised frame absent
"informed consent" to go elsewhere.
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B. The Danger Inherent in Mediator Evaluations
What hazards do parties face in electing to have the mediator give an
opinion on the merits? Why all the fuss about so-called decisional moves?
Why should informed consent be required for mediator opinions?
The following is a list of potential dangers:43
* an evaluation might jeopardize the actual or perceived neutrality of
the mediator,44 which in turn jeopardizes a mediator's continued
usefulness;45
* an evaluation might interfere with party self-determination (insofar
as parties bow to a neutral's expertise and opinion);46
* an evaluation made on the basis of incomplete or limited information
or in the absence of expert opinions can be highly speculative;
" the evaluator may be wrong (as to facts, the credibility and weight of
evidence, the burden of proof, or the law);
* even if the evaluator is right, a subsequent arbitrator, judge or jury
may not reach the same conclusion;
" an evaluation based in some part on information obtained in
caucuses (without the opportunity for rebuttal by the other side) rests
on inferior evidence than the evidence that an arbitrator, judge or
jury would have;
" an evaluation might violate the reasonable expectations of the parties
regarding the nature of mediation;
* an evaluation may end negotiations by polarizing the parties and
entrenching their positions, in effect prolonging rather than
shortening litigation (or disputing) where the party disfavored by the
evaluation is not willing to compromise and the favored party is
entrenched given the neutral's endorsement;
43 See generally Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not
Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 937 (1997) (exploring in more depth the dangers listed
here).
44 Laflin, supra note 7, at 497 (stating that a perceived loss of neutrality undermines
the disfavored party's perception of a fair process and can result in an unwillingness to
continue); Marjorie Corman Aaron, Symposium, Standards of Professional Care in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DIsP. RESOL. 95, 107 (noting that the "loser" in
an evaluation may view the mediator as an adversary resulting in the potential loss of
perceived neutrality).
45 This observation leads some commentators to recommend evaluations only at the
end of a mediation when facilitation has not achieved agreement. See Aaron, supra note
5, at 62.
46 But see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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* evaluation detracts from the focus on party responsibility for critical
evaluation, re-evaluation, and creative problem-solving;
* evaluation by a mediator who has another profession (e.g., law or
psychology) can generate cross-profession confusion;47
" an anticipated evaluation will importantly effect mediation
representation and party negotiation. 48
Some of these hazards are best illustrated by an example. As you read the
example, note that the break-down or harm caused by the evaluation is
compounded by no disclosure and no consent.
A landlord-tenant matter. The mediator (who either is or is not a lawyer) in
a community dispute resolution center tells the landlord and tenant parties,
who are disputing about a pet in the tenant's apartment, that since there is a
lease provision precluding pets, that issue should be taken off the table
because, legally, the pet must go. (Trouble is: the law is more complicated,
providing that where a landlord does not object to a pet within a certain
time frame, a no-pet lease provision is waived.)
One can easily imagine a thoughtful evaluation saving parties expense
and aggravation of further disputing. However, the evaluation should be
requested, proffered in the light of various hazards, and rendered with due
care. These ideals were not met in the example above. Here, the mediator's
neutrality may well be lost in the eyes of the tenant, who (for whatever set of
reasons) feels entitled to have the pet; the evaluation is wrong (or
dangerously incomplete); the evaluation may end any hope of successful
negotiation and integrative solution, entrenching the landlord in his position
of "no pets." If the mediator is a lawyer, then the lawyer should have done
adequate research before making the evaluative statement. If the mediator is
47 Laflin, supra note 7, at 479.
48 See Harold I. Abramson, Mining Mediation Rules for Representation
Opportunities and Obstacles, 15 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 103, 105-06 (2004) [hereinafter
Mining Mediation] (stating that giving the mediator power to recommend settlements can
"singularly pigeonhole and shape your entire mediation representation
strategy... [inducing the attorney to] approach the mediation more like a judicial process
than a negotiation. Instead of viewing the mediator as a facilitator, you may view the
mediator as a decision maker. Instead of formulating a negotiation strategy based on
meeting parties' interests, you may be impelled to formulate a strategy designed to
persuade the mediator to recommend favorable settlement proposals."); Harold I.
Abramson, Problem-Solving Advocacy in Mediations: A Model of Client Representation,
10 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 103, 123-28 (2005) [hereinafter Problem-Solving Advocacy]
(arguing that the anticipation of mediator evaluation will likely result in attorneys
withholding information and hiding flexibility, hence diluting mediation's potential as a
problem-solving process).
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not a lawyer, then she could be deemed to have engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. These same dynamics could play out in the context of
virtually all case types.
C. A Duty to Warn
Given the potential dangers of mediator evaluation and the prescription
of informed consent, what doctrines might create a duty to warn and,
conversely, liability for a failure to warn?
1. Torts
In tort law, to establish negligence, a plaintiff must first prove a duty on
the part of the defendant. 49 For example, the familiar warnings about
cigarette smoking on cigarette cartons that alert the consumer of dangers
prior to use are a manifestation of the duty to warn. So too are the leaflets
accompanying prescription drugs that, read closely, would give any person
pause regarding the cure being worse than the disease.
It is not simple, however, to know what or how much to say. If I offer
you my horse to ride, must I remind you that riding is dangerous? That the
terrain has holes and the horse may trip? That there are branches in the
woods and you must duck? Does it make a difference if the horse is a high-
strung thoroughbred or a placid school horse? Must I tell you that riding
horses can lead to serious injury and death in order to discharge a
responsibility I may have that you be informed before you consent to ride?
Once you do consent, how careful must I be? Does it matter if you are a
novice or experienced rider? Can I trust your assessment (or my own
judgment) on that question? Do I have to be sure your horse's girth (the piece
of equipment that holds on the saddle) is tightened? Must I ensure that you
are wearing a helmet and have heels on your boots (to prevent the stirrup
from slipping)? Laws in some states require that a posted warning indicate
that riding can lead to death in order for tort liability to be avoided.
These questions are not unlike those faced by a mediator. Disputes
represent crises in human interaction. Approaches to resolving conflicts may
have important repercussions on the rest of a disputant's life. Before
engaging in a particular process or before changing the chosen process or
49 The elements of a malpractice action include the following: that defendant owed
plaintiff a duty; that defendant failed to perform or breached that duty; that the breach
was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; and that plaintiff was damaged. See
generally Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 144 (1985) (finding facts sufficient to
establish a cause of action for social worker malpractice).
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approach, it seems obvious that disputants must be informed about a
proposed approach (or change in approach) and what the repercussions might
be.
Generally, customary practice in the relevant arena provides one measure
of the requisite standard of care. As Professor Jennifer Shultz writes:
Once legal standards of care for ... mediators are determined,
violations of these standards will result in negligence. This is important
because currently, "accountability really does not exist, because there are no
generally accepted standards that must be adhered to, and, consequently it
[is] difficult to establish malpractice, no matter how unfair the process or
the result. ' 50
Such a standard needs to be developed, as Professor Shultz points out.
In the torts arena, beyond simple negligence liability arising from a
breach of a duty to warn and consequent damages, a mediator who fails to
inform and to warn could conceivably be subject to liability for other tort-
based conduct. 51 If the mediator's conduct were egregious enough, a
mediator could potentially be held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 52 In addition, an injured party in the appropriate
circumstances could charge that the mediator's violation of his duty to
inform and warn amounted to an intentional and wrongful interference with
his contractual rights or his economic opportunity. 53
Tort law represents but one theory informing the standard of care applied
to mediators in performing the function of obtaining informed consent prior
to conducting an evaluation. Other approaches include: contracts and
fiduciary duties. These theories are discussed in turn.
2. Contracts
For a mediator to be liable under a contract theory for a failure to warn or
to obtain informed consent, a party would need to demonstrate a breach of
either an implied or express term in the mediation contract.
54
If a mediator fails to obtain informed consent or to warn about
limitations and dangers of a proposed evaluation process to be used, the
50 Jennifer L. Schulz, Mediator Liability: Using Custom to Determine Standards of
Care, 65 SASK. L. REV. 163, 178 (2002) (quoting Carol S. Bruch, When to Use and When
to Avoid Mediation, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 101, 107 (1993)).
51 Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 159 (2003).
52 Id. at 159-61.
53 Id. at 159.
54 Id. at 163.
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mediator is vulnerable to a party's claim that the mediator violated terms in
the contract that were so important to self-determination that they should be
implied. As Professor Moffitt observes, "[t]he principal term implied into a
mediation contract would be a covenant of good faith, binding a mediator to
mediate with reasonable skill and care."'55 Where the mediator violates an
accepted norm of "reasonable" practice within mediation generally, she may
be liable under a contract theory for resulting damages.
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators supply a relevant norm
that specifically references the mediator's responsibility to obtain the parties'
consent for any change in role. Section VI.5. posits a line between the role of
mediators and other professionals, and Section VI.8. cautions that any change
of role should have the parties' endorsement.
STANDARD VI. QUALITY OF THE PROCESS
VI.5. The role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional
roles. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another profession is
problematic and thus, a mediator should distinguish between the roles. A
mediator may provide information that the mediator is qualified by training
or experience to provide, only if the mediator can do so consistent with
these Standards ....
VI.8. A mediator shall not undertake an additional dispute resolution role in
the same matter without the consent of the parties. Before providing such
service, a mediator shall inform the parties of the implications of the change
in process and obtain their consent to the change. A mediator who
undertakes such role assumes different duties and responsibilities that may
be governed by other standards. 56
Beyond liability based on implied contract terms, to the extent that the
mediator expressly promises in a contract or opening statement to refrain
from providing an evaluation absent agreement of the parties, a breach of
such an express term could be actionable.
Provision from a Retainer Agreement
The mediator's role is to facilitate the resolution of the dispute. Legal
evaluations or opinions by the mediator will be given only by consent of all
parties and are not to be relied on in resolving this matter. The parties agree
that the mediator is not acting as an attorney or legal representative or
judge or providing legal advice on behalf of or for the benefit of any party.
-from a Retainer Agreement of Carrie Menkel-Meadow
55 Id. at 166 (footnotes and citations omitted).
56 MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 17.
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3. Fiduciary Duty
Some experts contend that mediators owe fiduciary duties to the parties
whose dispute they mediate. 57 Stated more explicitly, "the mediator is said to
represent the integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense ... that
the mediator has a special fiduciary relationship with both parties to a
dispute. '58 A fiduciary relationship generally is imbued with qualities of
trust, confidence, and good faith.59 As Professor Chaykin points out:
A mediator actively seeks to gain the trust of the mediatrants in order to
maximize effectiveness. Parties to a mediation will reveal the most intimate
personal and financial information to the mediator. The parties rely on the
mediator to be truthful and honest and to conduct the mediation in such a
manner that both parties are treated fairly ....
Trust is such an essential element of the mediator's work, it could be
argued, that mediators generally should be held to the virtually per se rule
applied to trustees and attorneys. Like attorneys, mediators agree to act for
the benefit of others; like trustees, they provide advice, guidance, and
expertise on affairs of grave importance to the parties. 60
Mediators may violate the duty of trustworthiness by deceiving parties as
to their credentials or by misinforming parties as to the kind of service that
will be provided.61 Consequently, the failure to obtain the parties' consent for
the mediator's provision of an evaluation may give rise to a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty. Where a court finds the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between a mediator and a party, the fiduciary will be under a
special duty of full disclosure.62 As Professor Chaykin observes, "[e]ven the
slightest breach of fiduciary duty may subject the fiduciary to liability. '63
57 Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U.
IN. L. REV. 731, 732 (1984); see also Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 825-26. But see
Moffitt, supra note 51, at 167-69.
58 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 826.
59 Chaykin, supra note 57, at 740.
6 0 Id. at 744-45.
61 Id. at 750.
62 See generally Horak v. Biris, 130 Ill. App. 3d 140, 145 (1985) (finding that a
social worker/therapist violated his fiduciary relationship with his patient and is therefore
subject to liability and damages).
63 Chaykin, supra note 57, at 742.
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D. Different Strokes for Different Folks?
1. Unrepresented Parties
Imagine, on the one hand, an unsophisticated, unrepresented, perhaps
illiterate party in mediation, and on the other hand, a highly sophisticated,
well-heeled, repeat player, represented by a prestigious law firm. The type of
disclosures and explanations appropriate from the mediator may well vary.
Mediators may owe a heightened duty of disclosure to unrepresented parties
than they owe to parties who come to mediation with lawyers.64 This
heightened duty suggests that extra caution should be exercised in obtaining
informed consent prior to a mediator evaluation in such circumstances.
Professor Nolan-Haley observes:
Fairness demands that each party understand what it is doing when it
engages in mediation decisionmaking. As a general proposition, more
information is required for those who may lack the ability to-negotiate
effectively for themselves. Overall, we must pay more attention to the
methodology of process disclosures that are typically given by the
mediator.65
One can easily imagine an unrepresented party giving undue weight to a
mediator's opinion (by mistaking someone sitting in the neutral's chair for a
judge), as contrasted with a sophisticated attorney who understands that any
one opinion (no matter how credible the source) does not end the
controversy. Consequently, mediators should take increased care to ensure
that unrepresented parties fully understand the risks and limitations of the
proposed evaluative process.
Where parties are represented by counsel, it is still important for
mediators to carefully explain the evaluative process in their opening
statement and along the way if the process changes. Relying on parties to
study mediator retainer agreements (when clients may rely on their lawyers
for that service) would be a mistake. The assumption that attorneys
understand the difference between mediation and an evaluative process may
be a mistake too.
2. Lay Mediators
All mediators should describe their relevant credentials to provide an
64 Nolan-Haley, supra note 1, at 833.
65 Id. at 833 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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evaluation and should have the requisite competence. Lay mediators,66
however, must be careful not to give legal or other professional advice. As a
general principle, the provision of legal advice by someone who is not
licensed to practice law is an actionable offense, and is prohibited in every
jurisdiction as the unauthorized practice of law. For example, if we assume
that the mediator in the landlord-tenant case described above (who advises a
tenant about the effect of a lease provision) was not a licensed attorney, then
he would have been prohibited from making that type of evaluation.
By the same token, mediators who are not social workers, psychologists,
or psychiatrists should not give advice about the psychological impact of
various courses of action.
On the other hand, a license to practice law, psychology or any other
profession does not mean one is competent to provide an opinion on a given
question. An attorney concentrating in intellectual property may not be
competent to evaluate an employment matter-at least not without
appropriate research. 67
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR DISCLOSURE
So we arrive back at the questions: What principles guide mediators in
providing parties with information relevant to the parties' consent to a
mediator's changing role? When must a mediator obtain consent to step near
(or over) the line into a decisional, evaluative role-into what has been called
"evaluative mediation?" 68
66 This term is used here to mean mediators without other professional degrees or
credentials.
67 See Bush, supra note 8, at 124-25 (urging that practitioners of evaluative
mediation "be held to standards appropriate for their role as expert case evaluators" and
suggesting that only lawyers should provide evaluative mediation in court-ordered or
law-related contexts).
68 Professor Leonard Riskin, whose pathbreaking work highlighted the differences
between evaluative and facilitative conduct of mediators (see Riskin, supra note 5) has
more recently shifted the descriptive terms to "elicitive" and "directive." See Leonard L.
Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and New New Grid System, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003). These new terms may be more helpful in analyzing
which conduct might interfere with self-determination. For example, a sharply focused
line of questions raising doubts about a party's position or a concerned look after a claim
is made may be more directive than an evaluation given after appropriate disclosures and
warnings described here. See Margaret L. Shaw, supra note 36, at 19 (pointing out that
facilitative mediators can be evaluative and that classification of mediators with these
labels risks being confusing and counterproductive).
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A. No Surprises
No one likes bad surprises. When expectations are lowered by thoughtful
warnings, one tends to appreciate what is provided and take precautions
against what might cause problems. Furthermore, disclosure and consent
passes the burden of responsibility to the person who assumes the risk. If I
choose to travel abroad after being forewarned that there are innumerable
hassles caused by security checks, I will pack in a manner to assure that my
carry-on baggage has my critical and valuable items and that I have reading
material to pass away time spent in lines. The lack of surprise when I
encounter long lines and lost baggage means that I can enjoy the benefits I
receive from foreign travel in a more constructive state of mind.
Adequate warning will enhance a mediator's credibility in that candor
and disclosure garners trust. In addition, accurate expectations will allow
attorneys to prepare appropriate representation plans and allow clients to
make appropriate disclosures. If, however, the task is to persuade the other
side and engage in problem solving, the representation and disclosures will
be different than they would be if the task is to persuade the neutral in a win-
lose contest.69 Certainly, where a lawyer-mediator has a reputation as both a
lawyer and a mediator, he must clarify what frame-or professional
identity-he is operating in, and the lawyer representative needs clarity
concerning whether she is in a more traditional adversarial arena or in a
problem-solving mode.
B. A Clear Warning
Any warning must indicate, with precision, the service being proffered
(e.g., "I will provide you with my best judgment, based solely on the
information provided in this mediation, of the likely jury award on this
claim. ") and the various dangers to the mediation that are entailed.
What would an adequate warning sound like? A mediator warning
parties of the hazards outlined above might offer the following:
You have asked me to give an opinion on the likely court outcome of
this matter, and I am willing to do that if you both agree to my providing
that service. However, you should understand that at least one of you may
not like my opinion and may feel I am no longer impartial. And, it may be
that I will be inclined toward the evaluation I provide. If that happens, I
may be unable to assist you further or may be less effective as a mediator.
Also, particularly if you think my opinion is wrong, you may be
69 See Mining Mediation, supra note 48, at 105; Problem-Solving Advocacy, supra
note 48, at 123-28.
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disadvantaged by it in subsequent negotiations.
While I will do my best to give you a thoughtful opinion, you should
understand I might be wrong-different lawyers come to different
conclusions-and my analysis will be based on information that is different
from what a judge, arbitrator, or jury would hear. My opinion will be based
on more limited evidence than the evidence available in adjudication, since
you have not completed discovery. Also, since I have learned information in
caucus and from confidential submissions that you have not heard or seen
and hence cannot rebut, you must rely on me to separate that out from
information I hear in joint session.
In any case, it is very speculative to predict what a particular judge
might do. I advise you to listen to your own counsel (or to get legal counsel)
to inform you and protect your legal rights.
Also, to the degree we focus on legal rights and the likely court
outcome, it may distract you from looking for more creative solutions that
might serve your interests better.
Are you sure you want me to give an evaluation?
This sort of statement might be most appropriate when a mediator begins
in a facilitative mode, and an evaluation is subsequently requested by the
parties. 70 Of course, the parties could select another neutral to provide the
evaluation, but in some cases (for efficiency reasons or because the parties
have developed trust and rapport with the mediator), they will want to retain
the same neutral. In contexts where the mediator knows in advance that her
regular practice encompasses evaluation, a disclosure should be provided
earlier and in writing.
C. Early Warning
Since the advocacy approach of attorneys and the willingness to share
certain types of information of parties may (and should!) depend on their
expectations regarding the role of the neutral, that role should be clarified at
the earliest point possible-ideally before the mediation begins. There are a
variety of ways to accomplish that in addition to the verbal disclosures
above.
70 Professor Dwight Golann points out that mediators shift styles with some
frequency during the course of a mediation. See Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation:
How-and Why-Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 41, 61.
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Program administrators can
describe with precision the
services offered by their panelists,
including whether panel mediators
offer legal and other professional
(psychology, accounting,
environmental) advice. For
example, the NASD Dispute
Resolution Program Mediator
Disclosure Report is sent to
prospective mediation parties. It
describes whether the mediator is
evaluative, facilitative or
combined. 71 If the same form
indicated whether or not the
mediator would give an opinion
on the merits of a claim or
defense, assuming a request by all
parties, it would provide the basis
of the informed consent suggested
here-so long as the mediator is
chosen by (not assigned to) the
parties. Or, in an agreement to
mediate parties can specify a
desired approach regarding
opinion and analysis on the merits
of an issue in dispute (see
excerpted agreement in box
giving an example of that
approach). Or, the rules and
regulations around mediators in
particular programs and
jurisdictions might provide a clear
framework for informing
consumers.72
Often it is at "final" impasse
Excerpt from a Sample Agreement to
Mediate
Approaches of the Mediator-
The parties agree to select a mediator with
the following mix of approaches selected in
the section. If the parties cannot or are not
ready to agree to all of the mediator
approaches at this time, the parties agree that
within five business days after selecting the
mediator, the mediator shall convene a pre-
mediation conference in which the mediator
will facilitate a discussion of the mix of
mediator approaches and any other issues the
parties want to resolve before the mediation
session ....
Select one for each subject area: [Only
provisions relevant to mediator evaluation
are included here.]
Manages Process By:
__ Facilitating Predominately
Evaluating Predominately
Following Transformative Approach
Resolve When Dispute Arises
Engage in Evaluation of Legal Issues or
Settlement Proposals:
None
__ Only After Parties Specifically
Consent to What is to be Evaluated
Leave to Discretion of Mediator
Resolve When Dispute Arises
Harold Abramson, MEDIATION REPRESENTATION:
ADVOCATING IN A PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS
APPENDIX G (2004).
71 For a description and analysis of the NASD Dispute Resolution Program
Mediator Disclosure Report see Shaw, supra note 36, at 18-19.
72 See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-
Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 34-52 (2001) (describing the development of Florida's ethical guidelines).
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that mediators offer an evaluation as a last-resort impasse-breaking device.
Two points need to be made about "final" impasse. First, it's not over until
it's over! Determining what constitutes final impasse is a tricky-and
perhaps illusory-affair. Parties can always re-commence negotiations and
mediation after a particular session fails to achieve resolution. The point is to
emphasize that all the warnings are in order despite the feeling that the
mediator may not be needed again. Second, parties frequently want an
evaluation because they believe it will be favorable to them. Attorneys want
an evaluation because they believe it will make their clients more flexible (or
benefit their clients). Evaluations, however, are likely to disappoint one (or
sometimes all) of the players. Parties need clear, accurate, and reasonable
expectations or a disservice can be rendered. A mediator does not want the
final act (if it is the final act) of the mediation to do harm.
V. STANDARD OF CARE IN PROVIDING OPINIONS AND EVALUATIONS
How careful must a mediator be in providing an opinion or professional
advice? If there is general disagreement and confusion about the required
scope and content of informed consent relative to an evaluative service or
process, the question of what standard of care applies to the evaluation or
opinion itself mirrors that disagreement and confusion. Some of the various
theories that apply to informed consent are relevant to the degree of care that
must be exercised in providing an evaluation. These include the following:
tort law, contract law, and fiduciary duty.
Under any theory one would expect the provision of an opinion to be
done with care. Negligence law would apply a "reasonableness" standard.
Contract law would ask what the agreement, or reasonable expectation, of the
parties were. As a fiduciary, a mediator would need to honor carefully a trust
relationship. Under any of these theories, one imagines a party expecting a
thoughtful assessment. Alexander Pope said:
A little learning is a dangerous thing;
Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian spring:
There shallow draughts intoxicate the brain,
And drinking largely sobers us again. 73
For example, a mediator who has seen many Blumberg form leases74
73 Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism, reprinted in THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY
OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 2509, 2514 (Abrams & Greenblatt eds., 7th ed. 2000).
74 Blumberg Forms Online, http://www.blumberglegalforms.com/html/BFOoverview.html
(for specific forms follow the "Select a Form" hyperlink).
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cannot blithely inform the parties in a noise dispute that since leases in urban
environments require that 90% of the floor space be carpeted, the noise-
making neighbor must get a carpet. If that sort of advice is being requested
and offered, the mediator should study the particular lease, and, if that
mediator is licensed to practice law, he must determine what exceptions
might exist. There is, after all, no rule without exceptions. "A little learning"
is knowledge about the rule. "Drinking largely" opens up the world of
shadows and exceptions.
We add to these points some principles:
" Always provide the basis and context of the evaluation. What "facts"
were found or relied on? What "evidence" undergirds the evaluation?
What expertise does the mediator have? What research is being
undertaken?
* Always urge parties to get independent evaluations, listen to their
own lawyers (if applicable), and consult their own judgment.
* Go to the library. That is, base the evaluation on a mode of thinking
and conduct that an evaluator or opinion-giver would engage in. No
lawyer, for example, should give an off-the-cuff opinion without
research unless he identifies it as such and warns about its fallibility.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have tried to enlarge the discussion on ethical boundaries and moral
guideposts for mediator opinion-giving. Evaluation can be a risky move, and
mediators should, as a base-line, do no harm in their practice. They should
foster-and not undermine-party self-determination. Insuring informed
consent for mediator evaluation both minimizes the possibility of harm and
maximizes the possibility of self-determination. Put another way, parties
should have a meaningful choice regarding whether their mediator uses the
tool of opinion-giving and should be aware of the dangers involved when
they make that choice.
When mediators do provide requested opinions, they should do so with
care. They should consider what information they are basing their opinion
on-is some of the "evidence" unreliable? That is, was it offered in a caucus
where the other side had no opportunity to respond? Opinions based on such
information are more likely to be unfair. Mediators should, metaphorically
speaking, go to the library before giving advice. They should review, take
time, and consult professional resources that would normally be double-
checked before a professional opinion was provided. At the very least, the
parties should understand what the decision is based on and its qualitative
difference from an opinion a judge, arbitrator, or neutral expert would make.
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WARNING THE UNWARY
Whether or not the mediator is willing to provide a requested evaluation
should be known early, rather than late, in the mediation, as it will impact
party willingness to share information and display flexibility. Consideration
should be given to the use of the caucus, as ex parte communications can
undermine the integrity of an evaluative role.
If mediation and justice are to be conjoined then the outcome in
mediation must stay in the hands of the parties, and, to the extent the
outcome is influenced by a neutral opinion, the requested opinion must be
given with caution and care, adding to, not detracting from, the parties'
capacity for meaningful self-determination.
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